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Causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian War 
 
A SYSTEMS LEVEL APPRAOCH 
  
ALDO D. ABITBOL 
University of Denver 




The emergence of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) nations as regional powers and 
future challengers to U.S. hegemony has been predicted by many, and is a topic of much debate 
among the IR community today. Interestingly, three of these nations have warred against each 
other in the past and, coincidentally or not, it was the nations that shared borders: India and 
China and China and Russia. This paper attempts an in-depth case study of the 1962 Sino-Indian 
conflict from an angle that differs from previous studies. Past explorations of this conflict have 
focused on domestic or the psychological motivations of political leaders for this abrupt war, but 
I will depart from these studies in assessing the conflict’s origin and exploring the reasons for its 
short duration. Employing a neorealist systems-level approach, I will attempt to explain how the 
structure of the international system both instigated the Sino-Indian confrontation and also 




 Sun Zi once said, “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors 
go to war first and then seek to win” (Zi 1988, 20). This declaration applies to the Sino-Indian 
Border War of 1962 fittingly because of the unprepared manner in which Jawaharlal Nehru 
entered into armed conflict with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Prime Minister Nehru, in 
a seemingly intractable diplomatic position authorized the use of force against PRC assets in 
Ladakh, south of the McMahon Line, in order to defend his conception of Indian territorial 
integrity on October 9, 1962 (Eekelen 1967, 114). The resulting response from the PRC was a 
devastating counterattack on October 20, 1962 crushing the Indian military. A second Chinese 
offensive began on November 16, 1962, completely defeating Indian forces in the region 
(Vertzberger 1984, 66). On November 21, 1962 the PRC declared a unilateral ceasefire, and 
withdrew 20 km behind the line of actual control represented in Figure 1. Afterwards, no further 
military engagements ensued. In the aftermath of this limited war the PRC suffered 1,400 
casualties in comparison with the Indian military’s 3,120 dead, 3,100 captured, and 1,000 
wounded (Feng, Cheng, and Wortzel 2003, 188). 
However, it is not the purpose of this paper to recount the battles or outcomes of the 1962 
Sino-Indian War. What is to be analyzed here is the question: why did the war erupt? Why was 
an ephemeral armed conflict necessary between China and India despite the peaceful settlement 
of border issues with other nations bordering China? This question is perplexing considering 
both the previously warm and amicable state of Sino-Indian relations, in addition to Zhou Enlai’s 
insistence that “[China] shall only use peaceful means and shall not permit any other kinds of 
methods” in resolving border issues (Maxwell 1995, 905). Additionally, a review of this conflict 
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is relevant today since both India and China are emerging regional and aspiring hegemonic 
powers. Thus, it is important to understand what brought these nations to war in the past in order 
to anticipate the possibility of a reoccurrence, which would have greater implications due to their 
growing power. Using Kenneth Waltz’s systems level of analysis method, it will be argued that a 
neorealist systemic level analysis best explains the factors that pushed both nations to war in 
1962, while accounting for the constraints that limited the conflict in scope and scale. 
 
Sino-Indian Relations 1950-1959 
 
The Sino-Indian relationship from 1950 to 1959 was particularly warm, and several reasons 
for these cordial relations existed. Arguably the most important was the hasty diplomatic 
recognition of the PRC in December 1949 by India, making them the second nation in the world 
after Burma to do so (Vertzberger 1984, 63). This conferment of legitimacy was helpful in 
establishing a cooperative environment with China, as many nations chose instead to recognize 
the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. Furthermore, India’s existence as a socialist and not a 
capitalist state, allowed for greater cooperation with the PRC since they did not come into direct 
conflict with Maoist ideology like the U.S. This basis of diplomatic and ideological congruency 
led Prime Minister Nehru to attempt to revolutionize international affairs by producing the 
Panchsheel Agreement between China and India in 1954. The Panchsheel Agreement stressed 
five points; (1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual 
non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs; (4) equality and mutual 
benefit, and finally; (5) peaceful coexistence (Eekelen 1967, 38). This agreement originates from 
Nehru’s optimism that post-colonial nations could invalidate the precepts of a bipolar world, and 
that the regional powers of Asia can contradict the validity of traditional balance of power 
politics.  
The diplomatic and ideological reasons for Sino-Indian cooperation are bolstered by shared 
historical experiences. Both China and India share a long and uninterrupted cultural and 
historical tradition. Both nations at one time were great powers. Most importantly though, both 
nations were invaded by Western imperialists and consummately humiliated and exploited. This 
occupation and exploitation by the West caused the growth of significant nationalist forces 
within India and China, and the desire to gain independence. The ROC received its independence 
in 1912, and the later consolidation of the PRC in 1949 ushered in a new era of Chinese 
sovereignty and independence from imperialism. Likewise, India achieved its independence from 
Britain in 1947. 
 Due to their history of Western occupation, China and India had additionally failed to 
develop independent industries. Their occupations meant that the Chinese and Indian economies 
were still largely agrarian, and dependent on the import of finished goods. This led the Indian 
government to implement a form of democratic socialism, while the PRC engaged in agrarian 
based communism, or Maoism. Regardless of their system’s differences, both nations abhorred 
capitalism creating an ideological common ground. Their common historical experience 
produced a familiar perspective upon which Indian and Chinese policymakers could relate to one 
another.  
 This environment of common history and diplomatic cooperation producing positive 
relations would be challenged by the Chinese policy of taking back historical possessions. The 
1950 invasion and takeover of Tibet by the PRC would begin to show strains in the relationship. 
Trepidation over Tibet’s seizure by the PRC was based in the idea of a historical Indian-Tibetan 
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relationship, but the Seventeen Points Agreement of May 1951 ironed out their differences with 
India recognizing China’s historical sovereignty over Tibet while still preserving Indian 
economic and social interests in Tibet. The agreement appeared to settle a possible dispute over 
Tibet between the two powers, but right-wing elements in the Indian parliament expressed this 
viewpoint of the PRC invasion, “the final action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is a little short 
of perfidy” (Vertzberger 1984, 64). This underlying opinion of the Tibet invasion by the PRC 
would bring forward another issue heightening tension in the relationship. 
 This issue was the definition of China’s border with India in the Northeast and Northwest. 
Maxwell argues that one of China’s diplomatic priorities was defining diplomatically agreed 
boundaries, as “boundaries are one of the first expressions of a modern state” and the PRC 
sought this validation of modernity (Maxwell 1995, 905). However, to not endanger Sino-Indian 
relations over the border question, Nehru and Zhou Enlai agreed to leave the border issue 
between mid-level bureaucrats to be mediated at a later date paving the way for the 1954 
Panchsheel Agreement (Hoffmann 1990, 32). Thus, this issue remained on the back-burner of 
Indian foreign policy until the PRC began to make moves towards its historical conception of 
Sino-Indian boundaries south of the McMahon Line in 1957. 
 Two years later Tibet rose up in a massive revolt against Chinese authority. China’s 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) moved in to put down the rebellion by breaking popular will in 
the capital of Lhasa. March 31, 1959 the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet into India where he was 
granted political asylum. This course of events angered the Indian public as they saw it as a 
renunciation of Indian trade and cultural access to Tibet guaranteed in the Seventeen Points 
Agreement (Vertzberger 1984, 65). PRC officials chaffed at India’s meddling in their domestic 
affairs by granting asylum to the Dalai Lama and thereby violating the 1954 Panchsheel 
agreement (Hoffmann 1990, 64). The Tibetan revolt combined with gradual Chinese assertion of 
borders in 1957 due to diplomatic impasse, are the primary factors contributing to a hostile Sino-
Indian diplomatic relationship from 1959 to the outbreak of hostilities. 
 
Origin and Events Leading to Border Dispute 
 
 The 1914 Simla Convention between Britain and Tibet established the McMahon Line as the 
official border between British India and China, denying the right of Chinese suzerainty over 
Tibet (Dalvi 1969, 11). However, the line’s namesake McMahon, was ordered back to London in 
disgrace over the “chicanery” he exercised in border negotiations in which he presented a 
different map to the Chinese envoy, thus distancing Britain from the legitimacy of the negotiated 
border (Maxwell 1995, 907). Thirty years later British cartographers began drawing the 
McMahon Line as the border between British India and China, thus reviving the lines legal 
legitimacy.  
 When India gained its independence from Britain in 1947 it inherited all of the British 
territorial agreements, and as such inherited the McMahon Line as the border between it and 
China. Indian belief in the legitimacy of the McMahon line dated back to the Simla Convention 
of 1914, as well as to the numerous maps of British India with the line delineating its northern 
border. As such Nehru shrugged off Chinese insistence in border negotiation during the 1954 
agreement stating that “the McMahon line marked their border with China, where was the need” 
(Varma 1965, 28)? Despite India’s view of the McMahon Line’s legitimacy, China had not 
signed the Simla Convention and under no circumstances consented to any bilateral agreement 
between Tibet and Britain because it violated their sovereignty (Gupta 1971, 523). 
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 Indian intransigence on negotiating a border acceptable to both parties led the PRC to act 
independently in areas south of the McMahon line. The justification for this was that in the 
absence of mutually negotiated borders, the true national boundary was a line of actual control 
represented by the extent of either nation’s ability to administrate the territory. Practical assertion 
of this idea was first revealed to India in 1957 when an Indian patrol discovered an all-weather 
road which had been constructed in the Aksai-Chin Plain connecting Xinjiang and Tibet 
(Vertzberger 1984, 65). The Indian government launched diplomatic protests asserting a 
violation of their territorial integrity; however the PRC “considered [Aksai-Chin] to have long 
been Chinese territory” (Maxwell 1995, 911). This issue was not resolved as the Indian 
government refused to engage in territorial negotiations until Chinese forces completely 
withdrew from the Aksai-Chin Plain. The PRC refused to do so, and instead of a diplomatic 
solution India began to pursue a more confrontational approach to assert their territorial claims. 
 The rebellion in Tibet helped to drastically sour relations between the PRC and India, but 
the border dispute widened due to a change in Indian military strategy. This change in military 
strategy was to create forward-posts behind the Chinese claim line, and in strategic locations to 
flank Chinese military positions (Hoffmann 1990, 94). These posts were constructed to assert 
Indian territorial claims in the Ladakh region and to threaten the Xinjian-Tibet road in Aksai-
Chin. By September, 1962 a similar series of forward posts had been built beyond the Chinese 
claim line in Tibet, and four such posts were built even beyond the McMahon Line (Hoffmann 
1990, 109). This resulted in an inability to claim that these posts were simply to defend Indian 
territorial integrity. The territorial dispute from India’s perspective, coupled with the building of 
forward military posts by the Indian military caused the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement to not be 
renewed in 1961. Crossing both the claim and McMahon lines, both nations were in violation of 
each other’s territorial conception, and India was now physically challenging Chinese 
sovereignty in Tibet.  
 
Defining the Systems Theory 
 
 Now that a historical context for Sino-Indian relations during the 20th Century has been 
established, it is necessary to define the systemic level theory from which the case will be 
analyzed. A systemic level of analysis eschews the individualities of states and the impact of 
individual leaders on foreign policy outcomes. Instead it focuses on the structure of the 
international system, and how this structure forces states to conform to a set of probable 
responses regardless of their individual differences.  
 In Kenneth Waltz’s seminal work, Man the State and War, he lays down the foundation for 
a levels-of-analysis framework for studying international relations. Waltz does not contend to 
have created this framework, but instead argues that different theories of international relations 
promote one or another level of analysis over the other. The basis of this assertion is in Waltz’s 
take on how is politics best to be studied, “Can man in society best be understood by studying 
man or by studying society” (2001, 5)? If one believes that man in society can best be understood 
by studying man then you will focus on individuals and reject the influence of society on them, 
and vice versa. This idea is then refocused from the question of man and politics to the question 
of why states go to war. 
Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau believe that war is driven essentially by the natural 
evilness of man. Essentially the “ubiquity of evil in human action arising from man’s 
ineradicable lust for power and transforming churches into political organizations …revolutions 
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into dictatorships… love for country into imperialism” (Waltz 2001, 24). From this perspective, 
society and government are not influential forces in history, but instead magnifiers of mans 
collective malevolence when grouped into nations. From a classical model states cannot 
cooperate because “passion often obscures the true interests of states as of men,” and not because 
“states are never honorable and peaceful” (Waltz 2001, 25). Waltzian neo-realism departs from 
these ideas by exploring the other half of the question. Believing that “Man is born and in his 
natural condition remains neither good nor bad,” but is influenced by society to one extreme or 
the other, as states are influenced by a society of states (the international arena) to engage in war 
or not (Waltz 2001, 5). 
Neorealist systems theory is driven by one primary characteristic: in no matter what form 
the system is structured, the system is driven by the essential existence of anarchy. The source of 
this anarchy is the absence of an overarching international body with the power to force the 
conformity of the units of the structure (the states). As such the United Nations and other 
international organizations are not important and have no bearing on the system since they lack 
the capability of shaping the unit actors decisions. Acknowledging this, states are the only 
relevant actors, and the anarchic system leaves them with two realities. The first is that states are 
responsible for their own security, and secondly that threats to this security are unending (Waltz 
2008, 59). 
Additionally, neo-realism departs from classical realism in that classical realists view power 
itself as the ultimate goal of the state, whereas neorealists view power as a means with the end 
being security (Waltz 2008, 57). Peace in an anarchic system is fragile, and therefore each state 
must provide for its own security. However, providing for one’s own security through military 
power or alliances often times undermines the security of neighboring states. This paradox where 
increasing a states security undermines the perception of security in another state is known as the 
“security dilemma,” and is a major structural explanation for the outbreak of war. This is due to 
the fact that one can never be certain if additional security measures are defensive or offensive in 
the anarchic system. Another cause on the systemic level for the outbreak of war is the failure of 
deterrence. Deterrence strategy implies a buildup of military force adequate enough in perception 
or reality to prevent a state from threatening another states security. If any state misperceives the 
deterrent capability of another, or believes it has a greater offensive capability war is likely to 
break out. 
 In addition to these universal characteristics of the systemic structure is the variable concept 
of how power in the international system is actually divided. In the period of the Sino-Indian war 
the world was locked in a bipolar balance of power led by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In a 
bipolar system states are rigidly aligned to either pole, but states in each camp have great 
flexibility of strategy. This was caused by the zero-sum nature of a bipolar system, in that the 
gain of one side is the loss of the other. As such, the leader of either faction is unwilling to allow 
client members to fail in policy endeavors. Finally, in a bipolar system states that refuse to join 
either faction drastically increase their security dilemma unless they have the power to challenge 
the international structure towards a multi-polar balance. Now that the neorealist systemic level 
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International Variables Leading to Conflict: India 
 
 The three main variables motivating Indian behavior towards conflict with China on the 
systemic level are: Indian national interests, the system’s influence on Indian behavior through 
structural constraints, and the relationship between Indian perception of the international 
structure and reality. To begin a systemic explanation of India’s actions we must first identify its 
national interests, as it is what drives Indian action throughout the international structure. 
According to neorealist thought the primary end of all states is security. This being the case, not 
only is security the primary Indian national interest, but any issue relating to national security 
becomes a primary interest. 
Official borders, and their enforcement is a primary interest of each state for obvious 
reasons. However, in the Indian case this issue takes on greater importance than it otherwise 
would for other nations. This can be attributed to two factors. The most prevalent factor was that 
India bordered a nation which not only questioned the legitimacy of the established border, but 
also violated it. The second factor is the modern international system is formed by the interaction 
of nation-states, which as defined by the Westphalian system are the only entities capable of 
legitimately exercising sovereignty. 
 A key component of nation-state status under the Westphalian system is the existence of 
demarcated and respected borders. These borders represent the extent of national sovereignty and 
define where each nation’s authority begins and ends. The questioning of India’s established 
border by China undermines both Indian sovereignty and security. Security is undermined first 
by the direct military and administrative challenge to Indian territory, and second by 
delegitimizing India’s position as a nation-state. If India can neither defend nor define borders 
respected by other nations, other states may begin to question their position as a nation-state in 
the system and then their sovereignty. This was a chief concern for India as they regarded the 
Chinese threat to their border as one compromising their “independence, self-determination, and 
position as a great power in Asia” (Vertzberger 1984, 67). 
 Another issue of national security relating to Indian interests was defense of the McMahon 
Line. Two key issues aided the creation of security dilemma situation along the McMahon Line. 
The first was the discovery of the Chinese road connecting Xinjiang and Tibet through the 
Aksai-Chin area in 1957. The second was the imposition of martial law on Tibet in 1959 by the 
PLA. China argued that completion of the road southeast of the McMahon Line in Aksai-Chin 
was simply the reestablishment of a historical commerce route from Xinjiang to Tibet (Eekelen 
1967, 110). This road not only represented a blatant Chinese violation of India’s McMahon Line 
border, but it also caused armed tension in the region. Shortly after the roads discovery, PLA 
frontier guards began patrolling the Aksai-Chin region, but never more than 20km away from the 
road’s location (Hoffmann 1990, 77). The issue of the road in Aksai-Chin and the PLA’s role in 
Tibet in 1959 became linked since the majority of Chinese troops entered Tibet via the road from 
Xinjiang. 
 The surge of PLA soldiers into Tibet aroused suspicions of a forcible border assertion by the 
PRC. These tensions were heightened by the flight of the Dalai Lama from Lhasa, and the 
closure of Tibet to commercial and cultural access by India, guaranteed in the 1951 treaty. 
Defensive maneuvers or not, these activities created a security dilemma along the border as India 
felt that Tibet was “essential for mastery over South Asia, and the most economical method for 
guaranteeing India's security” (Garver 2006, 93). Forced to account for increasing Chinese 
military power near or past the McMahon Line, India responded by deploying their military in 
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forward positions along the border with China as early as 1960. Accounting for India’s national 
interest with force posturing, they attempted to both affirm the legitimacy of the McMahon Line 
as a border and to account for the security dilemma created by the hardening of PLA positions in 
Tibet and Aksai-Chin. 
 The second way a systemic level analysis accounts for the 1962 war is the manner in which 
India’s policy was defined by the structure of the international system. In looking at the 
geostrategic positioning of India within the system, it is immediately apparent that they 
attempted to remain neutral or unaligned in the bipolar structure. India remained a powerful 
enough state to deter the third world adventurism of either bloc within its territory, but weak 
enough to be challenged by hostile neighbors. An excellent example of this was the persistent 
threat of Pakistan on their Northwestern border. The poor relationship of Pakistan and India is 
rooted in domestic level variables, but a systemic level cause was a disputed claim over the 
sovereignty of Kashmir. Both sides claim the right to sovereignty over Kashmir, and this has 
resulted in a heavily armed border. Additionally, appearances of a Sino-Pakistani agreement to 
hem in India developed with Chinese diplomatic overtures to Pakistan for peaceful border 
settlement beginning in 1961 (Dalvi 1969, 42-47). This forced India to take a hard-line stance in 
their border dispute with China out of fear that concessions would show weakness, and endanger 
their control of Kashmir in a Domino-Theory type logic train. 
  Another structural element of the international system was the existence of nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear weapons invalidated traditional calculations of deterrence, and thus the great 
powers were those whom possessed them. In India’s regional calculations neither themselves, 
nor did any other surrounding nations possess nuclear weapons keeping intact the use of 
deterrence as a method of securing or defending interests. This being the case, the option of 
engaging in armed conflict with surrounding nations remained possible as long as in India’s 
force calculations they were superior to their target. A prime example of India’s employment of 
force to further interests was their invasion of Portuguese controlled Goa on December 17, 1961 
(Eekelen 1967, 75). This use of force to assert sovereignty over perceived territory is an 
excellent precedent for the October 9, 1962 offensive against the PLA in Ladakh. Force against 
PLA incursions remained off the table as long as the Indian military believed their strategic 
position and capabilities to be inferior to the Chinese. Returning from a 1960 diplomatic tour of 
the U.S., Nehru expressed the idea that due to Soviet and Western military aid, “the military 
balance had changed in favor of India” (Eekelen 1967, 109). Thus in the absence of nuclear 
weapons, India disregarded the Chinese effort at deterrence and employed the use of force to 
settle their territorial claims. 
 Finally, it is necessary to point out how India’s perception of the international system, which 
differed from reality, influenced their decision to employ force against the PRC. India perceived 
the international system as open to change from a bipolar to a multi-polar structure. This was 
based in their success of remaining unaligned to either bloc, while still receiving significant 
military and economic aid from both camps. Given India’s strategic geographic position in the 
system, both superpowers sought to gain the allegiance of India to their side through the use of 
aid. Understanding this, India played both sides against each other, and assumed that either 
superpower would be willing to intervene on their behalf in the event of Sino-Indian hostilities 
for pragmatic and alliance building reasons. Thus, India viewed its use of force as a no lose 
situation. Either the force would succeed in attaining their national interests, or if Indian power 
proved to be inadequate, “the superpowers would intervene to prevent any large-scale war 
between India and China;” therefore, bailing out India from a potential catastrophe (Vertzberger 
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1984, 101). This perception of Indian value to either superpower and the general misperception 
of the international system would cost them. 
 Ultimately the Indians failed to acknowledge that while the interests of the superpowers may 
partially depend on India’s well being, the system is ultimately in anarchy and each nation is 
responsible for assuring their own security. Additionally, India had miscalculated both the 
willingness and ability of the superpowers to intervene on their behalf. In reality the Soviet 
Union could not exercise restraint on Chinese actions or compel them to drop the border issue. 
The Sino-Soviet split had not yet occurred, but its origin is in the late 1950’s, and the attempt to 
restrain PRC actions towards India was a contributing factor in the decline of Soviet influence 
(Vertzberger 1984, 92). Indian belief in U.S. intervention was based on a miscalculation of U.S. 
interests in Asia, as well as willingness to repel PRC advance based on the Domino Theory. 
While the U.S. intervened in Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina, India overlooked the essential 
element common to each. This element was the inability of each nation to resist communist 
advance on its own. In this case, the projected image of Indian power was a liability. The 
realities of the international system and its anarchic nature would ensure that their decision to use 
force would not be consequence free. Now the Chinese causes for war will be evaluated at the 
systemic level. 
 
International Variables Leading to Conflict: China 
 
 The systemic level variables motivating China towards conflict, like in India, revolved 
around Chinese national interests, the system’s influence on Chinese behavior through structural 
constraints, and the role of anarchy in the system. Because of the anarchic structure of the 
international system, China is no different than India and state security must be its prime end. 
China’s membership in the communist bloc does not grant it any guarantee of protection, and 
therefore its national interests are calculated in ways of maximizing national security. As such 
we shall discuss the three main interests affected by the border dispute with India. 
 As in India’s case, the delineation of official borders for the PRC was a prime interest in 
order to gain legitimacy in the international system. This legitimacy is rooted within the 
conventions of the Westphalian system, where borders are paramount as they define the extent of 
sovereignty and political self-determination. The PRC’s inheritance of territory which was 
divided by Western imperialists had a strong legal and pragmatic interest in negotiating 
legitimate borders with its neighbors. The basis of Chinese territorial definition was on the extent 
of historical holdings, but the PRC had determined in 1950 to negotiate borders based off the 
alignments they had inherited (Maxwell 1995, 905). This meant that China would not bog itself 
down in unreasonable claims in Indochina or other areas of traditional imperial suzerainty. This 
mentality guided border settlement by peaceful means with Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Mongolia, Cambodia, and Laos (Maxwell 1995, 905). Peaceful settlement of the 
Sino-Indian border however, was not possible due to Indian unwillingness to negotiate based on 
the perceived legitimacy of the McMahon Line (Hoffmann 1990, 71). 
 A second national interest challenged by the border dispute with India was the Chinese right 
to non-intervention of foreigners in their domestic affairs. This principle of domestic sanctity 
from outside interference is also one of the rights of states in the Westphalian system. Chinese 
security was undermined by India’s role in manipulating domestic events in both Tibet and in 
Ladakh. The Indian military’s establishment of forward posts and patrols of the Ladakh region, 
beginning in 1960, was direct interference in Chinese domestic areas. While it was true China 
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did not have legal sovereignty over the Ladakh area due to its position south of the McMahon 
Line, that argument remains moot as international boundaries must be agreed upon at least 
bilaterally, and the PRC gave it no such recognition (Cukwurah 1967, 159). Furthermore, 
Ladakh, and more importantly the Aksai-Chin plain was a strategically important tract of land 
connecting Xinjiang and Tibet. 
 Indian interference in Tibet after the 1959 uprising was also taken as a direct violation of 
domestic sanctity, and a challenge to Chinese security and interests. The PRC became aware of 
Indian efforts to covertly aid the Dalai Lama and Tibetan separatists shortly after the PLA moved 
in to suppress the uprising. In fact, India had gone so far as to allow the CIA bases of operation 
along the border for a covert campaign in Tibet from 1957 to 1961 (Garver 2006, 97). 
Furthermore, a series of four Indian military bases were constructed and manned in Tibet north 
of the McMahon Line. These actions illustrated India’s desire to keep Tibet as a buffer state, and 
recognize Chinese suzerainty instead of sovereignty in the region, thus directly challenging 
China’s security. 
 The Chinese interest of maintaining a secure border with India was also threatened by the 
border dispute. Reinforcement of Tibet after 1959, the Aksai-Chin road way, and Chinese 
military patrols of the border were an attempt to maintain their territorial integrity. This added 
military presence created a security dilemma for India, and they began building up and 
strengthening their own military capacity near contested areas. The adoption of a forward Indian 
military policy in 1960, coupled with Indian scouting patrols across the border and the 
construction of military posts around Ladakh and Tibet severely undermined Chinese border 
security. This led to the PLA “digging in” around contested border areas and effectively 
militarizing the border. 
 China’s response to the Indian military buildup as well as their covert programs in contested 
border areas was constrained by the structure of the international environment. A major 
constraining force on Chinese action was the geostrategic situation in Asia during the late 
1950’s. Beginning in 1950 with the Korean War, the major battles of the Cold War were fought 
in Asia in the West’s effort to contain the communist bloc. The PRC had to contend with anti-
Chinese forces in South Korea, a U.S. backed ROC in Taiwan, a U.S.-fortified Japan, and 
increasing U.S. involvement in Indochina by 1960. These numerous threats on China’s Western 
front were significant, and severely limited their maneuverability in other areas of concern. 
Unbeknownst to the West, the PRC was increasingly unable to depend on the support of the 
communist bloc due to increasing belligerence from the U.S.S.R. on various diplomatic and 
territorial issues. The Soviets pressured the PRC to acknowledge Indian border claims, and Sino-
Soviet relations strained under their own border issues (Vertzberger 1984, 88). 
 Acknowledging the limiting effects of these security threats on Chinese military power, the 
PRC advocated a policy of peaceful border settlement. China used this policy to its advantage 
and scored a critical victory in neutralizing a potential Pakistani threat to their security interests 
by a warming of relations. The geostrategic environment in which the PRC found itself was one 
of being surrounded by a ring of hostile states. Indian diplomatic intransigence on border issues 
and known subversion in Tibet added another threat in that ring. Thus, the structure of the 
international environment drove the PRC to rely on diplomacy to achieve its interests against 
minor powers in order to preserve its military power for guarding its borders against larger 
threats. This situation explains a seemingly coincidental rapprochement in relations with 
Pakistan, India’s arch-rival, while Sino-Indian relations simultaneously deteriorated in 1959. 
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 This hostile geostrategic environment ruled out the option of using military force to settle 
the border dispute with India because of the potential pitfall of starting a two front war. Thus 
PRC actions along the Indian border were limited by the international structure to defensive 
posturing, deterrence, and entrenchment. This is illustrated by the numerous Chinese overtures to 
Indian representatives to keep patrols 20km behind each border (Eekelen 1967, 92-111). 
Rapprochement with Pakistan was pragmatic in the freedom of action the PRC gained by not 
needing to guard the Sino-Pakistani border heavily. Therefore, Chinese policy was constrained 
by the system to not initiate force against India in order to settle the border dispute, but instead to 
bolster its defenses. However, the PRC declared that “force would be met with force” on the 
border issue, and this is evidenced by the PLA counter offensives launched on October 20 and 
November 16, 1962 (Maxwell 1995, 905). 
 Finally, the anarchy present in the international system played a significant role in the 
actions of the PRC on the border issue. Unlike their Indian counterparts, China properly assessed 
the international situation and never lost sight of the fact that only China could assure Chinese 
security. The emerging Sino-Soviet split was a key element in the PRC’s unwillingness to rely 
on outside support for their interests. Not only did the Soviets urge China to a settlement counter 
to their interests, but they openly aided India in both the construction of a domestic MIG 
program and a pledge to help them develop nuclear energy (Vertzberger 1984, 87). 
Simultaneously, Soviet aid to China was severely cut including assistance in developing a 
nuclear program. Clearly a common Soviet-Sino communist ideology was unimportant to their 
“allies,” as they even ventured to grant India great power status through nuclear development. 
 In addition to the Soviet military aid was U.S. support of India in the form of agricultural 
assistance and millions in financial aid packages. Although India pledged neutrality, the PRC 
clearly believed that they were in the West’s bloc. Indian based CIA operations into Tibet and 
India’s role in the Korean War helped bolster this perception. Unable to rely on either 
superpower for protection or intervention on their behalf, the PRC assessed that any military 
movements in securing the border would have to be proportional, decisive, and most importantly 
retaliatory. This assessment was gained from a rational calculation of the potential geostrategic 
and political consequences of a PLA initiation of force. While neither the PRC nor India 
possessed nuclear weapons, they feared a PLA offensive into India would be interpreted by the 
West as communist advance and therefore provoke a nuclear response. In the wake of the 
Taiwan Straits Crisis, and keeping in mind Sino-Soviet agitation, China was unwilling to risk a 
potential nuclear strike from the West, especially without full Soviet support. This being the 
case, China resolved that its armed response to Indian aggression would be purely political. The 
PRC would paint itself as the victim of aggression, but would then unleash a massive but 
calculated counterattack to force diplomatic concessions by India on the border issue, thereby 
resolving the issue once and for all (Eekelen 1967, 191-192). While the systems level of analysis 
plainly explains both the motives and limitations of India and China leading to the Sino-Indian 
War, it is contended that the model overlooks key motivations of either state leading to conflict. 
 
Alternative Explanations of Conflict: Domestic Level Analysis 
 
A valid criticism of a systemic level approach to explaining conflict is that it overlooks key 
variables and differences between states in the assumption that all states are equal due to 
constraints that the structure of the international system places upon them. Singer argues that at 
this level of analysis “actors are characterized and their behavior predicted in relatively gross and 
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general terms” (Singer 1961, 82). To account for the generalization of state behavior inherent in 
a systemic level analysis a brief domestic level analysis explaining the Sino-Indian war will be 
attempted. Based on Vertberger’s literature review on the subject, my domestic level analysis 
will be limited to the most influential domestic variable driving China and India to war; 
ideological and political considerations (Vertzberger 1984, 70). 
 Indian ideological and political causes for war centered on the belief in non-alignment as a 
viable alternative to the bipolar system. The source of Indian non-aligned thought was that the 
Cold War was a conflict between the imperialist Western nations, and therefore newly 
independent former colonies had no reason or interest in siding with their former masters. The 
Indians by remaining non-aligned, hoped to establish a third pole of power in the international 
system organized by the nations of the Third World. This third bloc of nations would fight for 
issues that really mattered to them such as ending colonialism, racial discrimination, and raising 
living standards in the developing world (Eekelen 1967, 4). Nehru envisioned that this Third 
World bloc would act as an arbiter in the West’s conflict, thereby gaining both moral authority 
and legitimacy.  
In concert with the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the Sino-Indian Panchsheel 
Agreement, Nehru hoped to expand his concept of non-alignment into a full-blown pan-
Asianism movement (Vertzberger 1984, 98). This pan-Asianism was based in the common 
historical experience of colonialism that these nations shared, but Nehru failed to account for 
historical differences and regional rivalries. Nehru asserted that, “the basic challenge in 
Southeast Asia is between India and China,” but he forgot this reality in supporting an Asian 
solidarity bloc. Nehru, and India’s conception of a non-aligned third world was based on not 
only its viability, but that India would be both the natural and unchallenged leader of such a 
group. Traditional Sino-Indian rivalry for influence in Asia challenged Indian thinking as China 
asserted its right to be the leader of such a group. The need to exert its regional great power 
status over China led to diplomatic intransigence on the issue of border negotiations. Thus, India 
saw Chinese dispute of border areas to be a political challenge to their right to lead Asia, and in 
turn pushed backed in order to show strength. 
Chinese ideological and political causes for war centered on the belief that its Maoist 
interpretation of communist revolution was not only correct, but purer than the Soviet model. 
This dispute on the merits of Maoism over Leninism was focused squarely on the Soviet Union’s 
insistence on backing the Indian position in the border dispute through political and military aid. 
The PRC challenged Soviet actions on three points; that their diplomatic position showed a lack 
of solidarity with a fellow communist nation, that Soviet support of a bourgeoisie regime in India 
would not forward the goal of communist revolution, and that India wasn’t truly non-aligned but 
in fact in league with the imperialists (Eekelen 1967, 177-182). Soviet military aid inflamed the 
PRC, especially in light of Soviet cuts to Chinese aid, because it appeared as if the Soviets were 
turning their backs on a Marxist brother. Furthermore, the PRC believed that only through 
struggle and challenge, not foreign aid, could they achieve the end of global Marxist revolution. 
Finally, Indian overtures to the West for aid, and their assistance to the West in fomenting 
problems on China’s border led the PRC on a quest to convince the Soviets that they were being 
used. The PRC concluded that superior PLA military forces and position in the region would 
force the Indians to rely on Western intervention to bail them out in the event of hostilities 
(Vertzberger 1984, 91). This would both expose the Indians as true imperialists, and score an 
ideological victory against the Soviet Union in the enlarging diplomatic split (Eekelen 1967, 
178). 
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The domestic level analysis contends that it is domestic differences between states that drive 
them towards conflict. Examining the most influential domestic factors (according to scholars on 
the subject) on Chinese and Indian decision making leading to the 1962 war, it seems as if 
ideology had differing levels of importance for each nation. Indian ideology and their belief in 
leading a pan-Asian bloc nationalized tensions with China, creating a zero-sum game. If the 
Indian’s backed down they would seem weak, and to avoid this they took a non-compromising 
stand on border issues. In China, Maoist ideology was more so an issue with hierarchy within the 
Soviet bloc than with Indian recalcitrance on border issues. The PRC actively believed the 
Indians not to be non-aligned, but this was not important as ideologically they did not pose a 
threat to the Chinese communist system. As such, Chinese ideology was not as important in 
crafting policy, and Zhou Enlai was able to take a pragmatic stand. As Singer points out the 
overgeneralization of a systemic analysis, he also points out that a domestic analysis suffers from 
the same weakness but instead an undue focus on state differences (Singer 1961, 83). The 
domestic analysis helps us better understand the importance of the border issue in each nation’s 
context, but in this case it does not adequately explain the actions undertaken by either regime. 
Furthermore, only with a systemic level analysis can we explore the limitation on action caused 
by the international structure on each state. Ultimately, Chinese ideology does not explain why 
they did not take the offensive to oust India as imperialists, or why India decided to change its 
military policy towards an aggressive forward base strategy. Therefore, a systemic level analysis 




 While valid alternative theoretical models explaining the causes for war exist, a neorealist 
systems-level analysis best explains the factors leading India and China to war in 1962. Keeping 
in mind the historical context of generally cordial Sino-Indian relations prior to 1959 it seems 
unlikely that solely ideological differences drove the two nations to war. If ideology was such an 
important motivator behind the militarization of the Sino-Indian border dispute, then it is 
unlikely conflict would have waited to develop until 1962. Additionally, if Sino-Indian rivalry 
for dominance in Asia was so virulent why did India recognize PRC sovereignty in Tibet in 
1951, and later agree to a mutual treaty of peaceful coexistence in 1954? A domestic level 
analysis cannot account for these otherwise amicable diplomatic relations. 
 What a systemic level analysis reveals is certain changes in national interests, geostrategic 
positions, and the anarchy of the international system brought both nations closer to the precipice 
of conflict. Various actions and reactions by both nations along the border created a security 
dilemma for each, and this brought the border dispute to the forefront of Sino-Indian relations. 
Furthermore, India believed they had the power to reshape the international system from a 
bipolar to multi-polar world. Their lack of either nuclear capability or significant conventional 
power exposed their status as simply a minor power of strategic importance in the international 
system. Thus either superpower was only motivated to preserve their security so long as it was in 
their interests to do so, and not as an ultimate necessity contrary to Indian belief. The ultimate 
cause for war in 1962 was India’s assertion that it was a major power in world affairs. China’s 
incentive in limiting their defeat of the Indian military was motivated by their interest in de-
legitimizing the McMahon Line and consolidating their sovereignty in Tibet (Guang 2005, 503). 
The systems level analysis reveals not only what urged each nation to war, but also explains how 
the anarchy of the system limited the extent of the fighting. 
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